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DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION: 
PRESUMPTION OR PROBABILITY? 
Richard F. Storrow 
Author’ Synopsis: A primary goal of the law of wills is to carry out the testator’s intent. However, when a 
testator dies leaving a succession of wills or having expressed to an attorney his or her plan to execute a new 
will, ascertaining the testator’s intent can be difficult. The problem is especially challenging when a court 
attempts to rationalize the testator’s intent with the principle of law that disallows correcting wills. This Article 
explores how courts have used the doctrine of dependent relative revocation to determine which testamentary 
scheme should be admitted to be probate. The application of this doctrine has unfortunately become untidy and 
unpredictable, due in part to the failure of courts to position their use of dependent relative revocation within 
the traditional framework of will interpretation. This Article explains the advantages of adopting a two-step 
interpretive process for applying the doctrine. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An excellent premise for an epic family drama: a succession of wills that surface after a testator’s death. 
Such wills can pose perplexing legal questions that defy easy answers. Cases like these invariably require that 
a court determine which testamentary scheme should be carried out. This determination entails a 
consideration of revocation and related doctrines, including—when appropriate—the doctrine of dependent 
relative revocation (DRR). As discussed below, there is no simple definition of this doctrine, but the dominant 
theory posits that an action that appears to constitute a perfectly valid revocation of a will should be denied 
legal effect because of the circumstances surrounding its performance.1 The doctrine is invoked to carry out 
the testator’s intent, but its use is a departure from the principle that the law does not permit the correction of 
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mistakes in wills.2 Perhaps for this reason, courts disfavor DRR in the law of wills and apply it “with caution” 
in only the most deserving cases.3 
The origin of DRR remains nebulous. How, after all, did it become a settled legal doctrine that a perfectly 
valid revocation (or what appears to be) is nonetheless conditional, equivocal, and ineffective? Unlike some 
of the other principles of the law of wills,4 the doctrine has not been codified.5 It thus remains the prerogative 
of the judiciary to shape and apply this doctrine. Courts on numerous occasions have stated that DRR raises a 
presumption of the probable intention of a reasonable testator.6 This jurisprudence suggests that DRR is a rule 
of construction that courts use when extrinsic evidence fails to resolve ambiguities in the will. But the 
tendency of other courts has been in a decidedly different direction.7 On many occasions, courts have invoked 
DRR clumsily and unconfidently in interpreting a succession of wills no matter the lack of connection 
between the wills.8 At other times, courts have applied DRR directly to the facts as if the doctrine were a rule 
of law instead of an interpretive device.9 A continuing lack of precision in applying DRR to individual cases 
has resulted in a body of jurisprudence that lacks coherence. 
This Article reflects on the reason why DRR exists in the law of wills and provides guidance for how to 
apply it in individual cases. The discussion reveals that what is most lacking in our theory of and approach to 
DRR is an understanding of how it functions as an interpretive tool. Most courts simply invoke and apply 
DRR as a legal principle, neglecting the fuller and more convincing analysis that would emerge from treating 
DRR as an interpretive device best used in two stages. The first stage would ask whether the circumstances 
surrounding the revocation render the intent to revoke ambiguous. The second would examine the probable 
intent of a reasonable testator to revoke or not to revoke in those circumstances. In this way, the analysis in 
DRR cases would not appear conclusory (as it so often does) and the attempts of lower courts to understand 
and employ this doctrine would not be so haphazard. DRR would no longer wrongly be thought of as a 
presumption but instead as a method of will interpretation. Applying DRR in two stages would also permit the 
courts to reconnect with the policy behind the doctrine and to realize how comfortably it fits within the larger 
context of will interpretation. 
This Article consists of three analytical parts. Part II examines the doctrinal underpinnings of DRR, 
positioning it within the context of the law of revocation and revival. This part theorizes why DRR exists in 
the law of wills despite the strong currents in that body of law against correcting the mistakes testators make. 
Part III examines the substantive imprecision that plagues discussions of DRR and the artificial distinctions 
among fact patterns that commentators have used in their attempts to clarify the doctrine. Part IV breaks new 
ground by advocating that commentators begin to think less about how to define DRR and more about how to 
apply it with greater consistency and coherence. This approach requires, as explained more fully below, 
                                                     
2 See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 455 (1953). The inroads made into this bedrock principle are 
important, albeit few. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 215 (2013). 
3 Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 276 So. 2d 661, 677 (Miss. 1973) (Sugg, J., dissenting); Nevada v. Palm (In re Estate of 
Melton), 272 P.3d 668, 679 (Nev. 2012) (quoting In re Patten’s Estate, 587 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Mont. 1978)); In re McCaffrey’s Estate, 
20 N.Y.S.2d 178, 183 (Sur. Ct. 1940). 
4 See Mary Louise Fellows & Gregory S. Alexander, Forty Years of Codification of Estates and Trusts Law: Lessons for the Next 
Generation, 40 GA. L. REV. 1049, 1071 (2006). 
5 But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.3 statutory note 1 (1999) (noting partial 
codification of the doctrine in Oklahoma). Statutory commentary suggests that a portion of Alabama’s pretermitted child statute is “an 
adaptation of the concept referred to as dependent relative revocation” because the provision grants a living child an intestate share of the 
testator’s estate when the testator executes the will under the mistaken belief that the child is dead. ALA. CODE § 43-8-91 cmt. (LexisNexis 
1975). 
6 See infra Part II.A.2. 
7 See, e.g., In re Will of Sharp, 852 N.Y.S.2d 713, 717 (Sur. Ct. 2008), rev’d sub nom. In re Estate of Sharp, 889 N.Y.S.2d 323, 
325 (App. Div. 2009). 
8 See id. 
9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.3 reporter’s note 1 (quoting Joseph Warren, 
Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 HARV. L. REV. 337, 344–46 (1920)) (noting “older” DRR cases in which the court applied the 
doctrine “automatically”). 
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conceptualizing DRR not as a rule of law but as an interpretive tool that needs to be used in accordance with 
well-settled will-interpretation methods. 
Before proceeding further, the author wishes to express that this Article’s analysis of DRR purposefully 
avoids using a categorization of fact patterns. Other commentators have used this framework,10 and the result 
is the unfortunate misimpression that the method used in applying DRR changes depending upon the form the 
revocation assumes and whether the alternative disposition is a validly executed will. However, this Article 
does discuss these categorizations in Part III.A as an aid to understanding the contexts in which mistaken 
revocation arises. Also, to avoid the confusion that can result from the assumption that DRR arises only in 
cases that involve two or more wills, the author uses the term “will” only when the instrument has been 
validly executed. When the instrument has not, the author refers to a “rough draft for future changes,” as one 
court has put it,11 or simply calls the writing a document or draft. 
II. DOCTRINAL UNDERPINNINGS 
Despite the reforms proposed in the Uniform Probate Code and the Restatement (Third) of Property 
(Restatement), the law remains hesitant to reform wills to correct mistakes. In most jurisdictions, common law 
limits the permissible correction of testamentary errors to a few instances: misdescriptions of property or 
beneficiaries, mistakes brought about through fraud, and DRR. Critics of the law’s hesitation to correct 
testamentary mistakes note the convention’s inconsistency with the principle that the testator’s intent is 
paramount. Nonetheless, no one seriously disputes that wills often fail to express testators’ “true” intentions, and 
that in correcting mistakes, a court will sometimes simply substitute what it believes the testator should have 
written. In this way, a court may run as roughshod over a testator’s wishes as the forger who sets out to defraud 
him. For this reason, it may be a long time before the law is ready to embrace a broader set of tools for 
reforming wills than currently exists. 
DRR, otherwise known as conditional revocation or ineffective revocation, is one of very few mistake-
correcting doctrines in the law of wills. The doctrine holds that a revocation is legally invalid if a testator has 
made some sort of mistake in performing it—specifically a mistake either related to her motivation for 
revoking the will or related to what she desires that revocation to accomplish. The theory behind the doctrine 
is that a revocation performed under these circumstances is “bereft of intent” to revoke.12 The effect of a 
successful application of the doctrine is to open the way for probate of the revoked will.13 DRR thus prevents 
mistaken revocations from destroying a testator’s carefully crafted estate plan. 
DRR has been defined in various ways—perhaps most frequently by citing Page: 
The gist of the doctrine is that if a testator cancels or destroys a will with a present intention of 
making a new one immediately and as a substitute and the new will is not made or, if made, 
fails of effect for any reason, it will be presumed that the testator preferred the old will to 
intestacy, and the old one will be admitted to probate in the absence of evidence overcoming 
the presumption.14 
This definition explains the label dependent relative revocation. The revocation in question is so related to 
the validity of the new instrument that the revocation is dependent upon it.15 A different definition, this one from 
Professor Jesse Dukeminier, proceeds as follows: “If the testator purports to revoke his will upon a mistaken 
assumption of law or fact, the revocation is ineffective if the testator would not have revoked his will had he 
                                                     
10 See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note 2, at 452–63; George E. Palmer, Dependent Relative Revocation and its Relation to Relief for 
Mistake, 69 MICH. L. REV. 989 (1971); Warren, supra note 9. 
11 Mothershed v. Lyles (In re Estate of Lyles), 615 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Miss. 1993). 
12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1. 
13 See id. 
14 La Croix v. Senecal (In re Dupre’s Estate), 99 A.2d 115, 117 (Conn. 1953) (citing 1 WILLIAM H. PAGE, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF WILLS § 478 (3d ed. 1941)). 
15 See DePaul v. Irwin (In re Estate of Anderson), 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 312 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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known the truth.”16 This definition does not refer to a new will or an alternative scheme of disposition, but 
simply calls into question the testator’s intent to revoke if he has performed the revocation while laboring under 
some erroneous understanding of either the law or facts. If we synthesize these definitions, we see that DRR 
cases are of two types: one involving a new will or an intent to make one and another involving the testator’s 
misapprehension of the law or a fact material to the revocation. The Restatement, acknowledging this dual 
definition, recognizes that DRR applies when a testator revokes his or her will “in connection with an attempt to 
achieve a dispositive objective that fails”17 and also when he or she does so “because of a false assumption of 
law” or fact.18 Courts tend to apply the doctrine only if (1) an alternative testamentary scheme fails, or (2) the 
mistake is set forth in the writing that revoked the will and the mistake is beyond the testator’s knowledge. 
Courts do a good job of discouraging the use of DRR; the law is clear that DRR is disfavored.19 Courts 
may be wary of the doctrine because utilizing DRR requires the admission of extrinsic evidence even when 
the words of the will are plain, and such admission is seemingly contrary to well-established principles of will 
interpretation.20 In other words, courts disfavor DRR not because conditionality of revocation is rare, but 
because such conditionality is rarely expressed.21 Additionally, DRR’s mistake-correcting effects run counter 
to the administrative efficiency the courts achieve by refusing to correct mistakes in wills.22 For these reasons, 
courts have said variously that DRR must be narrowly applied or at least, applied with caution.23 Courts have 
also imposed various limitations on the scope of the doctrine—sometimes refusing to employ it “unless the 
two instruments reflect a very similar dispositive scheme,”24 or rejecting it when the will itself does not recite 
the mistake of fact under which the testator was laboring. Other courts look for evidence that the revocation is 
part of “one scheme” to prepare a new will, and at least one court has rejected DRR when the testator had not 
made a rough draft of his testamentary preferences or visited an attorney.25 
The law does not make perfectly clear whether DRR is a primary presumption, a presumption used to negate 
competing presumptions, or a canon of construction that establishes the probable intent behind a revocation. The 
Restatement describes DRR as rendering the revocation “presumptively ineffective.”26 Other cases recognize 
presumptions relating to revocations before proceeding to a discussion of DRR27 and using it to rebut those 
presumptions.28 Still other cases describe DRR as “a rule of presumed intention,”29 or even more confusingly, a 
                                                     
16 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 295 (8th ed. 2009). 
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.3(a)(1) (1999). 
18 Id. § 4.3(a)(2). 
19 See In re Estate of Fidazzo, No. 65-06-526, 2007 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 153, at *4 (C.P. Ct. Westmoreland Cnty. June 
28, 2007). 
20 See Kroll v. Nehmer, 705 A.2d 716, 718 (Md. 1998); Note, Reinstatement of Wills Under Doctrine of Dependent Relative 
Revocation, 50 YALE L.J. 518, 523 (1941) [herein-after Reinstatement of Wills]. 
21 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., TEACHER’S MANUAL: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 4–50 (8th ed. 2009) (“Usually, the condition will 
not even occur to the testator.”). 
22 See Palmer, supra note 10, at 990 (“It rests upon an analysis that, with few exceptions, is found nowhere else in the law relating to 
mistake in underlying assumptions.”). 
23 See Nevada v. Palm (In re Estate of Melton), 272 P.3d 668, 679 (Nev. 2012) (citing In re Patten’s Estate, 587 P.2d 1307, 1309 
(Mont. 1978)); Kroll, 705 A.2d at 718 (“great care and caution”). 
24 In re Estate of Melton, 272 P.3d at 678 (citing Kroll, 705 A.2d at 722–23). 
25 See Mincey v. Deckle, 662 S.E.2d 126, 127–28 (Ga. 2008) (rejecting DRR because “it appears that [the] Decedent revoked the 
1998 Will before he even visited an estate planning attorney about creating a new will”); Schneider v. Harrington, 71 N.E.2d 242, 244 
(Mass. 1947) (stating that DRR is applicable when changes are a part of “one transaction”). 
26 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.3(a) (1999); see also La Croix v. Senecal (In re 
Dupre’s Estate), 99 A.2d 115 (Conn. 1953); Churchill v. Allessio, 719 A.2d 913, 916 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998); Kroll, 705 A.2d at 720 
(citing A.G.S., Annotation, Effect of Testator’s Attempted Physical Alteration of Will After Execution, 62 A.L.R. 1367, 1409 (1929)). 
27 See Mincey, 662 S.E.2d at 127 (“[T]here is a presumption of revocation in this case because the original will was never 
found.”); In re Estate of Pierce, No. 60117, 1998 Va. Cir. LEXIS 398, at *3 (Cir. Ct. of Fairfax Cnty. Dec. 30, 1998) (“Moreover, 
there is the unrebutted presumption that the testator marked these pages with the intent to revoke.”). 
28 See Dan v. Dan, 288 P.3d 480 (Alaska 2012); In re Estate of Pierce, 1998 Va. Cir. LEXIS 398, at *3. 
29 Carter v. First United Methodist Church of Albany, 271 S.E.2d 493, 497 (Ga. 1980) (quoting VERNER F. CHAFFIN, STUDIES IN 
THE GEORGIA LAW OF DECEDENT’S ESTATES AND FUTURE INTERESTS 184, 186 ( 1978)). 
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“concept of presumed probable intent.”30 Another describes DRR as “a rule of testamentary construction.”31 Part 
IV will explore this confusion about how DRR functions analytically with the goal of establishing an approach 
to DRR that is more in keeping with traditional will-interpretation principles. 
The policy behind DRR is to help effectuate the testator’s intent. Indeed, Professor Emeritus George Palmer 
calls this policy “the sole justification” for the existence of the doctrine.32 Effectuating the testator’s intent does 
not explain why, though, the law permits the correction of mistaken revocations but refuses to correct other 
mistakes that testators make in their wills. If DRR is an exception to the principle that courts do not correct 
mistakes in wills, one justification for the doctrine may be that the courts use it to correct what they view as 
innocent mistakes for which an estate plan should not suffer. The cases and the commentary, however, are 
unilluminating on this point—the author posits a theory about the policy behind DRR later in this Article. 
A. Revocation 
DRR involves, as its name suggests, revocation—the act of destroying or replacing a will. Determining 
whether a testator has or has not revoked his will is critical to establishing the testator’s testamentary plan.33 A 
claim of revocation may be brought at various stages of a probate proceeding. A challenger may use the claim 
to refute a will’s admission to probate in the first instance34 or, once the will is admitted to probate, the court 
may consider the claim of revocation in a proceeding to construe the will.35 
Revocation is achieved by a physical act done to the will or by a sub-sequent will that alters the will 
entirely or in part. An act, no matter how destructive, is not a revocation without revocatory intent.36 This 
qualification means that the testator’s accidental destruction of his will, or acts not committed by the testator 
(or at his direction) are not revocations at all. Moreover, a writing procured through undue influence or fraud, 
or executed by a testator lacking testamentary capacity has no revocatory effect on prior testamentary 
instruments even if it contains a clause expressly revoking all prior wills or provisions that are inconsistent 
with clauses in prior wills.37 
1. Time of Legal Effect 
One characteristic of revocations that differs from dispositive provisions in wills is that (in some 
jurisdictions at least) revocations take legal effect the moment the testator performs the physical act or validly 
executes a subsequent instrument.38 Notwithstanding this general principle, the revocation will not take effect if 
the subsequent instrument is for some reason invalid (for example, for lack of testamentary capacity or undue 
influence), or if the revocation itself is somehow faulty. Dispositive provisions, by contrast, are not legally 
effective until the testator dies—they are ambulatory.39 Because a will is ambulatory, if the testator discovers the 
                                                     
30 In re Estate of Redford, No. 09-01714, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1371, at *21 (Ch. Div. May 9, 2011). 
31 Estate of Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 957 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (citing In re Estate of Holt, 174 A.2d 874, 877 (Pa. 1961)). 
32 Palmer, supra note 10, at 997. 
33 See Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 276 So. 2d 661, 667 (Miss. 1973) (discussing the case of Hairston v. Hairston, 30 
Miss. 276 (1855)). 
34 See, e.g., Redman-Tafoya v. Armijo, 126 P.3d 1200, 1211 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005); In re Will of Dehn, 347 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (Sur. 
Ct. 1973); In re Estate of Rohrbaugh, Nos. FI 2002-68397, CL 2009-16701, 2011 WL 3891498, at *5 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 2011). 
35 See, e.g., Pegram v. Pegram (In re Estate of Pegram), 189 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); Bailey v. Warren, 319 
S.W.3d 185 (Tex. App. 2010) (revocation by operation of law). 
36 See Roberts v. Fisher, 105 N.E.2d 595, 599 (Ind. 1952). 
37 See In re Estate of Redford, No. 09-01714, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1371, at *25 (Ch. Div. May 9, 2011) (“In order for the 
revocatory clause in the 2005 Will to be effective, obviously the court would need to be satisfied that it was the Decedent’s desire, 
untainted by undue influence, to revoke the 1997 Will.”); Wood v. Bettis (In re Estate of Cooper), 880 P.2d 961, 962 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
38 See Garrett v. Powers (In re Estate of Garrett), No. D038435, 2002 WL 1288765, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. June 12, 2002) (“[T]he 
Second Will's revocation of the First Will was effective immediately on Pierce’s execution of the Second Will.”); Shephard v. Gebo 
(In re Krukenberg), 361 P.2d 537, 540 (Nev. 1961) (“[A] codicil valid when made which expressly revokes a provision of a will 
unconditionally, takes effect as of the date of its execution . . . .”); In re Will of Lake, 560 N.Y.S.2d 966, 967 (Sur. Ct. 1990) (“The 
revocation is said to be consummated at the moment of execution of the codicil.”). 
39 See 79 AM. JUR. 2d Wills § 144 (2013). 
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flaw rendering her will either totally or partially invalid, she has the opportunity to execute the will properly 
before she dies. Revocations, however, are not ambulatory and as such cannot be undone so easily.40 
The practical import of a revocation’s immediate effect is perhaps most evident in “antirevival” states. A 
will in such a jurisdiction, once revoked by a subsequent will or its inconsistent provisions, is not revived by 
simply revoking the subsequent will.41 In fact, if at the testator’s death a testamentary disposition is invalid for 
some reason not related to the validity of the will as a whole,42 the disposition has nonetheless already revoked 
prior inconsistent will provisions.43 Even the presence of invalid dispositive or appointive provisions in a will 
does not undermine the effectiveness of the revocation.44 In other words, “the instrument is in a sense operative, 
but the party to take under it is not allowed to receive the benefit.”45 Ordinarily, property that is the subject of an 
ineffective testamentary provision is distributed via the will’s residuary clause or by intestacy.46 
The fact that wills are ambulatory but revocations are not in some states may be one reason why the law 
does not favor the correction of mistakes in wills, but does allow the curing of mistaken revocations through 
the application of DRR. A testator is free to replace her will, if she wishes, during her lifetime, but once she 
revokes her will the potential damage to her estate plan is more difficult to undo. DRR provides an important 
safeguard protecting improvident testators who are drawn to tinker with their wills or who seek the advice of 
unskilled legal counsel. 
2. Presumptions 
Certain presumptions that exist in the interpretation of wills bear on the applicability of DRR. One of 
these presumptions is that a testator has revoked his will by physical act if the will was in his possession 
immediately before his death, but then after his death cannot be found.47 This presumption should (and does) 
act as an impediment to applying DRR, because the disappearance of a will can make it difficult to show that 
the will’s revocation was performed with the desire to replace it. Even if DRR is applicable in such cases, 
proving the contents of a will that is no longer in existence is not always possible.48 
A second important presumption is that when a testator has performed a revocatory act on a will, he did 
so with the intent to revoke it.49 This presumption is a precise example of how evidence of surrounding 
                                                     
40 See Riggins v. Floyd, 189 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005). 
41 See In re Estate of Garrett, 2002 WL 1288765, at *7 (“The fact that [the testator] subsequently revoked the Second Will does 
not show that it or its revocation of the First Will never became effective . . . .”); In re Will of Lake, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 967 (Sur. Ct. 
1990) (“The subsequent revocation of the codicil does not revive those provisions of the will which had been revoked by the execution 
of the codicil.”). 
42 A dispositive provision might be inoperative for any number of reasons such as the rule against perpetuities, lapse, voidness, 
the existence of a pretermitted child, the effect of a spouse’s election against the will, or the incapacity of the beneficiary to take the 
property. See generally DUKEMINIER, supra note 16. 
43 See In re Estate of Holt, 174 A.2d 874, 877 (Pa. 1961) (“[W]here the revoking instrument is in itself valid and operative but 
the subsequent disposition fails for some extrinsic reason such as the incapacity of the devisee to take, the revocation nevertheless 
remains effective.”). 
44 See Woodfield v. Woodfield (In re Estate of Woodfield), 968 So. 2d 421, 430 (Miss. 2007). But see Frank L. Schiavo, 
Dependent Relative Revocation Has Gone Astray: It Should Return to its Roots, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 73, 84 (2006) (suggesting that an 
alternative analysis in a DRR matter is a holding that an invalid provision in a subsequent will does not revoke a valid provision in a 
prior will). 
45 Tupper v. Tupper, (1855) 69 Eng. Rep. 627, 628; see also Burcham v. Kamoraski (In re Lubbe), 142 So. 2d 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1962), overruled on other grounds Flagship First Nat’l Bank of Ormond Beach v. Morris (In re Johnson), 359 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 
1978); Crawford v. Crawford (In re Crawford), 82 So. 2d 823, 826 (Miss. 1955); In re Melville’s Estate, 91 A. 679, 681 (Pa. 1914). 
46 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-604(a) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 260 (Supp. 2013) (discussing failed devises other than a 
residuary devise); 97 C.J.S. Wills 2108 (2013) (discussing failed residuary devises). 
47 See Stretz v. Baldwin (In re Staiger’s Will), 154 N.E. 312, 312 (N.Y. 1926); In re Estate of Huang, 811 N.Y.S.2d 885, 885 
(Sur. Ct. 2005). 
48 See generally A.M. Swarthout, Annotation, Proof of Contents in Establishment of Lost Will, 126 A.L.R. 1139 (1940). See also 
Dan v. Dan. 288 P.3d 480, 483 (Alaska 2012) (requiring the execution and contents of a lost will to be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence). 
49 See In re Estate of Pierce, No. 60117, 1998 Va. Cir. LEXIS 398, at *3 (Cir. Ct. of Fairfax Cnty. Dec. 30, 1998). 
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circumstances can raise doubt about the testator’s actual intent.50 Because it will be impossible, in most cases, 
to know the true revocatory intent of the testator in these circumstances, using DRR appropriately resolves the 
ambiguity by assessing the testator’s probable intention with reference to what the typical testator would do 
under such circumstances. 
A third important presumption in the interpretation of wills is the one against intestacy. When a testator 
dies with a validly executed will, courts presume that he desired not to die intestate with regard to any portion 
of his estate51 unless the terms of the will itself plainly show that he did so intend.52 Even though language in 
some judicial opinions suggests a general distaste for intestacy,53 this presumption applies only when the 
testator has executed a will and has demonstrated at least a minimum resolve not to die intestate.54 The 
presumption, too, is triggered only when a will is susceptible to more than one construction.55 Courts most 
often use the presumption to resolve ambiguous dispositive provisions that may result in partial intestacy.56 
Sometimes courts state that the presumption against intestacy is an important consideration in a DRR 
case.57 Indeed, in some DRR cases the presumption against intestacy—so central in other contexts—appears 
to overwhelm the court’s analysis. Courts may rely heavily on this presumption in the DRR context because 
concluding that a revocation should be ignored based on the presumption against intestacy is easier than a 
more searching evaluation of whether the evidence shows that the testator revoked a will with the desire to 
substitute a new will either immediately or in the future.58 
A student of wills law has good reason to question the use of the presumption against intestacy in DRR 
cases. When the evidence shows that a testator revoked his will in ambiguous circumstances, invalidating the 
revocation with DRR requires more than simply invoking the presumption against intestacy.59 For DRR to 
apply at all, courts need evidence supporting an inference that the testator’s probable intent was not to revoke 
her will unless a replacement will was effective.60 Raising such an inference requires more specific evidence 
than does the presumption that a testator did not wish to die intestate.61 Thus, if DRR has become a relevant 
consideration, it is because the evidence in the case points to either a lack of intent to revoke under the 
circumstances or a preference for intestacy.62 Therefore, if a court has firm grounding for applying DRR in a 
given case, the analysis of the facts has already proceeded beyond the point where the presumption against 
intestacy would remain relevant: “The law’s preference for a testate disposition is always subordinate to the 
                                                     
50 See In re Makofsky, 120 So. 2d 277, 279 (La. Ct. App. 1960) (suggesting that proving that the testator accidentally destroyed 
his will is possible “if the necessary proof is available,” but noting that this case lacked proof because according to witness testimony, 
the testator tore his will to pieces with the intent to destroy); In re Burke’s Will, 91 N.Y.S.2d 636, 637 (Sur. Ct. 1949) (admitting to 
probate a will destroyed by an intoxicated testator). 
51 See Anthony v. Evangelical Lutheran Church (In re Estate of Anthony), 121 N.W.2d 772, 779 (Minn. 1963). 
52 See Bowman v. Brown, 149 A.2d 56, 60 (Pa. 1959). 
53 See Kroll v. Nehmer, 705 A.2d 716, 720 (Md. 1998); In re Estate of Teubert, 298 S.E.2d 456, 460 (W. Va. 1982) (“[T]he law 
favors testacy over intestacy.”). The court in Estate of Teubert referred to how permitting holographic wills, because of the wills’ 
minimal execution requirements, assists laypersons in executing their own wills. See id. 
54 See In re Hill’s Will, 255 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sur. Ct. 1965). 
55 See In re Gregory’s Estate, 70 So. 2d 903, 907 (Fla. 1954). 
56 See, e.g., Basile v. Aldrich (In re Estate of Aldrich), 70 So. 3d 683 (Fla. Ct. App. 2011); In re Tweedie’s Will, 48 N.W.2d 657, 
659 (Minn. 1951); In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (Sur. Ct. 2002). 
57 See, e.g., Kroll, 705 A.2d at 720 (remarking that DRR comes into play when “the effect of not disregarding the revocation is 
for the decedent’s estate, or some part of it, to pass intestate”); Anthony v. Evangelical Lutheran Church (In re Estate of Anthony), 
121 N.W.2d 772, 779 (Minn. 1963); In re Estate of Sharp, 889 N.Y.S.2d 323, 325 (App. Div. 2009) (“[DRR] is, thus, ‘a rule of 
interpretation of intention . . . [that] seeks to avoid intestacy where a will has once been duly executed and the acts of the testator in 
relation to its revocation seem conditional or equivocal.’”) (quoting In re Macomber’s Will, 87 N.Y.S.2d 308, 312 (App. Div. 1949)). 
58 See, e.g., In re Will of Sharp, 852 N.Y.S.2d 713, 717 (Sur. Ct. 2008), rev’d sub nom. In re Estate of Sharp, 889 N.Y.S.2d at 
325. 
59 For an example of evidence that courts have considered in their application of DRR, see Kroll, 705 A.2d at 722. 
60 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.3 cmt. c, illus. 5. 
61 See id. 
62 See Reinstatement of Wills, supra note 20, at 521 (“[DRR] should be applied to nullify revocations only where the evidence 
affirmatively indicates that the deceased would prefer reinstatement of the revoked will to intestacy.”). 
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intention of the testator . . . .”63 Automatically applying the presumption against intestacy could cause courts 
to ignore, for example, that in some cases a testator who revokes a will because he wishes to make a new one 
may never get around to finalizing the new one.64 Raising the presumption against intestacy in such a case 
would negate the testator’s intention to be without a will until a new one is drawn.65 Furthermore, a court 
should never use a presumption disfavoring intestacy to bolster a flimsy body of evidence and to tip the scales 
in favor of DRR.66 As one court stated, “[t]he doctrine can only apply where there is a clear intent of the 
testator that the revocation of the old will is made conditional on the validity of the new one . . . . Evidence of 
this intent cannot be left to speculation, supposition, conjecture or possibility.”67 As a final consideration, 
because DRR aims to resolve a revocation shown to be ambiguous by the surrounding circumstances, the 
presumption against intestacy is not needed to carry out that task in a DRR case. Simply put, the presumption 
against intestacy has little to offer to a court’s analysis of DRR when the circumstances of the matter have not 
put that doctrine in play. 
None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that the presumption against intestacy is never relevant to 
revocation. If a case contains no evidence supporting DRR and is for that reason not susceptible to the more 
searching assessment of intent the doctrine requires, and if the revocation was some-how ambiguous (for 
example, when a clause in a will distributing only a portion of a testator’s estate does not make sufficiently 
plain that the testator is revoking all prior wills), then the court could appropriately invoke the presumption 
against intestacy to determine that the second will revoked the prior will only to the extent of inconsistent 
provisions. 
B. Revival 
Mistaken revocations can have disastrous intent-defeating effects upon an estate plan. Although a will’s 
dispositive provisions are ambulatory and can therefore be changed at any time before death, a will’s revocatory 
effect upon previous wills is immediate. Many testators do not realize this distinction and some have revoked 
their most recent will in the belief that doing so revives an earlier will. Thus, DRR is sometimes associated with 
the doctrine of revival. 
There is no doctrine in the law of wills that suggests that a will, once revoked by physical act, can be 
revived by somehow undoing, cancelling, or reversing the revocation.68 Once the revocation has taken effect, 
a physical act revocation—absent DRR—cannot be made to disappear so easily. Some disharmony exists in 
the law of wills on the question of whether the revocation of an instrument that revokes a prior disposition 
revives the revoked disposition. The Supreme Court of Minnesota has articulated four different jurisdictional 
                                                     
63 Kroll, 705 A.2d at 720. 
64 See, e.g., Roberts v. Fisher, 105 N.E.2d 595, 600 (Ind. 1952). 
65 See Mincey v. Deckle, 662 S.E.2d 126, 127–28 (Ga. 2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 4.3 cmt. c, illus. 5 (1999); Palmer, supra note 10, at 997 (discussing In re Emernecker’s Estate, 67 A. 701 (Pa. 1907)). 
66 See, e.g., In re Will of Sharp, 852 N.Y.S.2d 713, 717 (Sur. Ct. 2008) (“[T]here is an alternative available to intestacy.”), rev’d 
sub nom. In re Estate of Sharp, 889 N.Y.S.2d 323, 325 (App. Div. 2009); In re Will of Collins, 458 N.Y.S.2d 987, 993 (Sur. Ct. 1982). 
67 Nevada v. Palm (In re Estate of Melton), 272 P.3d 668, 678 (Nev. 2012) (quoting 95 C.J.S. Wills § 412 (2011)); see also In re 
Patten’s Estate, 587 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Mont. 1978); In re Estate of Pierce, No. 60117, 1998 Va. Cir. LEXIS 398, at *3–4 (Cir. Ct. of 
Fairfax Cnty. Dec. 30, 1998) (quoting 95 C.J.S. Wills § 267 (2011)) (“Dependent relative revocation can ‘only apply where there is a 
clear intent of the testator that the revocation of the old will is made conditional . . . .’”). 
68 The Restatement rejects this proposition by allowing a testator to “reverse” a physical act revocation by performing another act 
such as taping a torn will back together or writing “disregard the cross-outs” on a will containing cancellations. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.2 cmt. b, illus. 8 (1999). The Reporter’s Note for this section does not cite any 
cases in support of its illustrations and the author’s research failed to uncover any. See Evans v. May, 923 S.W.2d 712, 713 (Tex. App. 
1996) (holding that a will torn by a third party that was not subsequently taped backed together was not properly revoked); see also In 
re Swanson, 58 So.1030 (La. 1912). But see Taylor v. Cummings (In re Estate of Riner), 207 N.E.2d 487, 488–89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) 
(holding that a will torn by a testator and subsequently taped back together by a third party was properly revoked); but cf. Briscoe v. 
Allison, 290 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tenn. 1956) (holding that revocation is unclear when the torn will is scotch-taped together by an 
unknown party). Even if a testator requests that the torn will be pasted back together or if she does the pasting herself, at least one 
court has reasoned that a revival has not occurred. See In re Makofsky, 120 So. 2d 277, 280 (La. Ct. App. 1960) (“Even if he himself 
had pasted the pieces together we doubt that by that act he could have breathed life into a dead document.”). 
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approaches to this question,69 so a testator’s lack of awareness of the law of the state where she revoked her 
second will or happened to be domiciled at her death should not be surprising. The Restatement states that 
revival occurs if the testator revokes the revoking will “by [an] act intending to revive the previously revoked 
will[,]”70 or by a writing whose terms “indicate an intent to revive the earlier will.”71 The Uniform Probate 
Code agrees, using slightly different language.72 A minority of states, however, embrace the rule of 
antirevival and declare that a previously revoked will remains revoked unless the will is re-executed or 
republished.73 Of course, if a revocation is conditional and the condition upon which the revocation hinges 
does not occur, the revocation does not take effect. This outcome is not the same thing as saying the first will 
is revived; to the contrary, the will simply has not been revoked to begin with. 
In practical terms, a testator who revokes her second will because she prefers her first will is probably 
thinking less in terms of revival and believes instead that revocations are ambulatory—that the second will 
can simply be done away with by getting rid of that instrument. One could hardly fault a testator for believing 
that tearing a new will to pieces would leave her with her old will: in many jurisdictions, this is precisely the 
result. Even in antirevival jurisdictions, there are bound to be cases when evidence simply does not come to 
the surface that a testator had a second will that he later revoked. In these jurisdictions, some cases 
doubtlessly involve testators who believed that the destruction of a subsequent will revived a prior will.74 But 
a common mistake is to suggest that DRR is an exception to the rule of nonrevival.75 Revival and DRR are 
distinct theories. On the one hand, revival is the reinstatement of a previously revoked will—triggered only if 
there has been a revocation.76 On the other hand, DRR calls into question whether a revocation has occurred 
at all by allowing a court to declare what appears to be a revocation legally invalid due to the testator’s lack of 
revocatory intent in the circumstances presented.77 To suggest that the legal effect of DRR is to reverse a 
revocation would require a valid, unconditional revocation to begin with, which is precisely what the doctrine 
of DRR does not recognize.78 Nonetheless, courts and commentators continue to characterize DRR as a tool 
for reviving a revoked will.79 
                                                     
69 See Tibbetts v. Garrett (In re Tibbetts’ Estate), 189 N.W. 401, 401 (Minn. 1922) (finding that the testator burned her second 
will “for the purpose of . . . leaving her first will in force”). 
70 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.2(a)(iii). 
71 Id. § 4.2(a)(iv); see also id. § 4.2(a)(ii). 
72 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-509(a) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 226–27 (2013). 
73 See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-4.6 (McKinney 2012). 
74 See, e.g., Ruedisili v. Henkey (In re Alburn’s Estate), 118 N.W.2d 919 (Wis. 1963) (finding that the testator destroyed her 
second will so that her first will would stand); In re Estate of Sharp, 889 N.Y.S.2d 323, 325 (App. Div. 2009) (noting the lack of any 
evidence that the testator wanted to revive her will). 
75 See Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 276 So. 2d 661, 663 (Miss. 1973); Nevada v. Palm (In re Estate of Melton), 272 
P.3d 668, 679 (Nev. 2012) (“[A] vital precept of the doctrine of [DRR] is that it does not revive a revoked will . . . .”); What is the 
Doctrine of “Dependent Relative Revocation?” (Oct. 4, 2010), http://theprobate.net/blog/what-is-the-doctrine-of-dependent-relative-
revocation/. 
76 See In re Estate of Melton, 272 P.2d at 679. 
77 See id.; Reinstatement of Wills, supra note 20, at 524 (“Doctrinally, however the situation can be distinguished from a case of 
revival: revival . . . involves the restoration of the first will and dependent relative revocation the restoration of the second will.”). 
78 See Palmer, supra note 10, at 990 (“[T]he conclusion is reached that there was no revocation for lack of the requisite intent.”). 
79 See, e.g., In re Estate of Gregory, No. C067902, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 746, at *10 (Jan. 30, 2013); Churchill v. 
Allessio, 719 A.2d 913, 915 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (describing a judgment that rendered a will “revoked . . . and then revived under 
the doctrine of [DRR]”); Oliva v. Oliva (In re Estate of Oliva), 880 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“The trial court found 
that this will could be revived by the doctrine of [DRR] . . . .”); Children’s Home Soc’y of Fla. v. Pratt (In re Estate of Pratt), 88 So. 2d 
499, 501 (Fla. 1956) (“[T]he prior disposition is revived . . . .”); In re Estate of Perrault, No. A09-1103, 2010 Minn. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 483, at *6 (Ct. App. May 25, 2010) (“The district court determined that . . . [the] decedent’s 1992 will was revived through the 
doctrine of [DRR].”); Carpenter v. Cosby (In re Estate of Carpenter), 34 So. 3d 1230, 1235 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting 
Mothershed v. Howell (In re Estate of Lyles)), 615 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Miss. 1993) (‘“[T]he prior disposition is revived . . . .’”); In re 
Estate of Sharp, 852 N.Y.S.2d 713, 717 (Sur. Ct. 2008) (“[DRR] can apply to revive the 1974 will . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. In re Estate 
of Sharp, 889 N.Y.S.2d 323; Schiavo, supra note 44, at 96 (suggesting that DRR be known as the “Doctrine of Retroactive Revival”). 
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III.    SUBSTANTIVE IMPRECISION 
DRR, recognized in almost every state,80 is a doctrine of testamentary construction that allows courts to 
undo or ignore mistaken revocations. When a testator revokes a will based on his or her mistaken belief that a 
newer will is valid or a previous will can be revived, the revocation is given no effect if the evidence also shows 
that the testator would have preferred the revoked will to intestacy.81 The typical case involves two instruments. 
A testator, contemplating changes to his or her will, might draft a new testamentary plan and tear up or make 
marks of cancellation across the old one.82 The new will may even be fully executed and contain a clause 
revoking all previous wills83 but is not entirely valid for some reason; perhaps it fails for lack of due execution or 
contains void bequests.84 A less common scenario finds the testator destroying his or her most recent will with 
the belief that the revocation will revive his or her previous will.85 As long as the revocation and the mistake 
about the validity of the preferred disposition so relate to each other that they form a single transaction, the 
doctrine treats the revocation as conditional on that validity. In this way, the doctrine strives to temper rigid 
formalism and to promote testamentary intent. 
Most courts agree that DRR is a matter of the testator’s intention and is a question of fact for the court.86 
Beyond this, DRR is plagued with definitional variation. In one case, DRR is a doctrine of presumed intention 
of what a testator would have done had he or she known that the new disposition that he or she was 
attempting to execute would be invalid.87 In another case, DRR is a doctrine of mistake. In yet another, DRR 
is a doctrine in service of “the law’s preference for a testate disposition.”88 In one case, the doctrine is used to 
“undo an otherwise sufficient revocation,”89 but in another it revives a revoked will.90 One seemingly 
common thread linking the decisions is that courts should apply DRR sparingly because it does not comport 
with the tenet that probate courts should not be in the business of correcting mistakes in wills.91 
A. Three Types of Revocation 
At the very least, we know that DRR does not apply unless there is what to the naked eye appears to be an 
unconditional revocation.92 Beyond this circumstance, harmonizing the various iterations of the doctrine 
reveals that it can apply to one of three distinct types of revocation. The classic definition of DRR involves a 
mistaken revocation. A mistaken revocation is an actual revocation, but is performed due to the testator’s 
misapprehension of either essential facts or the law. Hence, underlying a mistaken revocation is the 
assumption that if the testator had known the truth he would not have revoked his will. 
The second type is an impliedly conditional revocation. Here, the testator has revoked his will but the 
revocation is made contingent, albeit not explicitly, on the existence of a particular set of affairs—the 
                                                     
80 Compare Smith v. Shaw, 60 So. 2d 865, 866 (La. 1952) (“Under our system of law there is no such doctrine as ‘Dependent 
Relative Revocation’ . . . .”), with ALA. CODE § 43-8-91 cmt. (1991) (“The concept of dependent relative revocation probably is part of 
the common law of Alabama . . . .”). 
81 See Kroll v. Nehmer, 705 A.2d 716, 722 (Md. 1998). 
82 See Carter v. First United Methodist Church of Albany, 271 S.E.2d 493 (Ga. 1980). 
83 See Second Church of Christ v. Kaufman (In re Kaufman’s Estate), 155 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1945); Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal 
Cathedral Found., 187 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
84 When a specific gift fails in a later (and otherwise valid) will as opposed to the total failure of a new will, some jurisdictions 
require that the testamentary intent be apparent from language contained in the valid (probated) will. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pratt, 88 
So. 2d at 501–04. 
85 See Ruedisili v. Henkey (In re Alburn’s Estate), 118 N.W.2d 919 (Wis. 1963). 
86 See, e.g., DeWald v. Whittenburg (In re Estate of Carroll), 925 P.2d 903, 906 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996). 
87 See Kroll v. Nehmer, 705 A.2d 716, 723 (Md. 1998). 
88 Id. at 720. 
89 Nevada v. Palm (In re Estate of Melton), 272 P.3d 668, 678 (Nev. 2012) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 503 (9th ed. 
2009)). 
90 See Carpenter v. Cosby (In re Estate of Carpenter), 34 So. 3d 1230, 1236–37 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). 
91 See In re Estate of Melton, 272 P.3d at 679 (citing In re Patten’s Estate, 587 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Mont. 1978)). 
92 See, e.g., In re Estate of Laura, 690 A.2d 1011, 1014 (N.H. 1997). 
11 
continued effectiveness of a new will, for example. Revocations made expressly conditional are rare and are 
not the subject of DRR. Instead, the theory is that DRR renders a mistaken revocation impliedly conditional 
on the efficacy of the dispositive scheme the testator was attempting to achieve. 
A third type of revocation to which DRR may apply is an ineffective revocation. Here, the revocation has 
simply not taken effect, perhaps contrary to the testator’s wish or perhaps because the attempt to revoke was 
performed by someone without testamentary capacity or due to the undue influence of another.93 In the three 
subsections that follow, each type of revocation is examined in further detail, bringing into focus the insight 
that the way a revocation is characterized in a DRR case will determine whether the court will conclude that a 
revocation has not taken place94 or, instead, that a revocation has taken place but should be ignored or 
cancelled, thus reviving the revoked testamentary plan.95 Finding decisions that define DRR with reference to 
two types of revocation—as in the case just described—is not uncommon; courts will adjudge a mistaken 
revocation as impliedly conditional or ineffective because of the testator’s misunderstanding.96 Commentators 
are apt to do the same.97 As will become clear, much confusion has resulted from the overuse in the decisions 
and treatises of the belief that DRR can transform a revocation into a nonrevocation. The resulting definitional 
imprecision of DRR has rendered the doctrine more malleable and unpredictable than our legal system should 
countenance. 
1. Conditional Revocation 
One type of revocation discussed and considered in DRR cases is a revocation that is conditional. The 
theory is that the testator’s mistaken revocation is impliedly conditional,98 and because the condition has not 
occurred, neither has the revocation.99 These impliedly conditional revocations with which DRR is concerned 
are distinguishable from expressly conditional revocations, which are rare100 and which bear little relationship 
to DRR. Professor Thomas Atkinson recognized this distinction, writing: 
Occasionally a revocation clause, by its terms is dependent on a condition. The intention is 
not to revoke absolutely but only in case that some future event happens. There should be no 
difficulty about this sort of provision. The revocation operates if the condition is fulfilled, but 
not if the contrary should prove to be the case.101 
Professor Joseph Warren, too, recognized that revocatory acts may be conditional by admitting parol 
testimony of the testator’s intent in an attempt to set the revocation in its “proper light.”102 Once determined to 
                                                     
93 See, e.g., Kemmerer v. Kemmerer, 139 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (incapacity); 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 469 (2013) 
(describing a “letter not intended as an immediate exercise of the testator’s power to revoke”). 
94 See, e.g., In re Estate of Carpenter, 34 So. 3d at 1235–36 (quoting Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 276 So. 2d 661, 666 
(Miss. 1973)) (‘“The basis for the doctrine of dependent relative revocation . . . is that there was never any revocation of the earlier 
instrument . . . .’”). 
95 See, e.g., id. at 1235 (quoting Mothershed v. Howell (In re Estate of Lyles), 615 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Miss. 1993)) (‘“[T]he prior 
disposition is revived on the theory that had the testator not been mistaken in his belief[,] he would not have revoked the original gift.”’). 
96 See id. 
97 See Chappelle v. Williams (In re Dougan’s Estate), 53 P.2d 511, 524 (Or. 1936) (“In an endeavor to give effect to the 
deceased’s intent, the doctrine construes his mistaken belief into a conditional revocation.”); ROGER W. ANDERSEN, UNDERSTANDING 
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 67 (4th ed. 2009) (stating that in a DRR case a court will “pretend” that mistaken revocation is actually a 
conditional revocation). But see DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 295 (stating that in a DRR case a court equates a mistaken 
revocation with an act performed without revocatory intent). 
98 See DePaul v. Irwin (In re Estate of Anderson), 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 312 (Ct. App. 1997). 
99 See, e.g., Berghmans v. Museum of Flight (In re Bowers), 131 P.3d 916, 921 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
100 See Atkinson, supra note 2, at 453 (“Few cases occur where there is actually a conditional frame of mind on the part of the 
testator in connection with a revocation.”). 
101 Id. at 452–53; see also Shephard v. Gebo (In re Krukenberg), 361 P.2d 537, 540 (Nev. 1961) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“[A] conditional revocation becomes effectual upon the happening of the condition.”); 95 C.J.S. Wills § 412 
(2013) (“[I]f the revocation is subject to a condition which is not fulfilled, the revocation does not take effect.”); Reinstatement of Wills, 
supra note 20, at 521; Warren, supra note 9, at 339. 
102 Warren, supra note 9, at 339. 
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be conditional, the revocation would not be ambiguous, and DRR would have no role to play in an analysis of 
its effectiveness.103 
Notably, the conditional revocation that relates to DRR is a complete fiction104 and is arguably at 
doctrinal odds with DRR. Again, a testator in a DRR case does not make her revocation expressly conditional; 
nor does she construe it as conditional in her mind.105 In addition, DRR is also premised on the assumption 
that had the testator known the truth, she would simply not have revoked her will, not revoked it 
conditionally.106 Thus, the probable intent that DRR is concerned with illuminating is in fact not an intent to 
revoke conditionally.107 Only if the testator had been aware that she might be making a mistake would she 
have elected to place conditions on her revocation.108 But DRR does not ask what the hypothetical reasonable 
testator who realizes she does not have all of the necessary information would do; on the contrary, it asks 
what the testator who knows the truth would do.109 Thus, it remains unclear whether the fiction of 
conditionality is at all useful in advancing an analysis of DRR or whether conditionality simply adds to the 
confusion about how this doctrine should operate. 
The courts appear to understand the problem even though they at times speak in terms of conditionality. In 
DRR cases, courts have reasoned that the circumstances surrounding the revocation show that if the testator had 
known the truth, she would not have revoked her will. They do not conclude that the better-informed reasonable 
testator would have made her revocation conditional. Thus, the notion of conditional revocations renders the law 
of DRR needlessly cumbersome, weighing it down with a legal fiction that does not advance the analysis. 
2. Ineffective Revocation 
The second type of revocation often mentioned along with DRR is ineffective revocation. One distinction 
between an ineffective revocation and a conditional revocation is that an ineffective revocation is not a 
revocation at all, while a conditional revocation is a revocation under some circumstances but not under 
others.110 Thus, the term ineffective revocation sounds as if it bears some relation to DRR, but it too, poorly 
conveys what the successful application of DRR achieves. 
Notably, the Restatement has adopted the term ineffective revocation as a substitute for DRR.111 The term 
also appears in the previously cited definition from Dukeminier: 
Simply put, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation (DRR) is this: If the testator 
purports to revoke his will upon a mistaken assumption of law or fact, the revocation is 
ineffective if the testator would not have revoked his will had he known the truth. The 
underlying theory is that the testator lacks true revocatory intent . . . .112 
                                                     
103 Other commentators may rightly challenge this statement, but the author’s sense is that a DRR case involving an expressly 
conditional revocation that was itself mistaken—a case we might describe as presenting “double conditionality”—is unlikely to ever 
occur. 
104 See Chappelle v. Williams (In re Dougan’s Estate), 53 P.2d 511, 524 (Or. 1936) (“[T]he doctrine construes his mistaken 
belief into a conditional revocation.”); Atkinson, supra note 2, at 454 (“feigned ground”). 
105 See Kroll v. Nehmer, 705 A.2d 716, 717 (Md. 1998). In the court’s discussion of the doctrine, it remarked: 
[I]n applying the doctrine, courts often speak in terms of a conditional revocation, regarding the revocation as 
conditioned on the existence of a set of facts or circumstances that the testator assumes to exist, when, in reality, 
the revocation is itself unconditional but is rather based on a mistaken frame of mind—a mistake of either fact or 
law. 
Id. 
106 See id. at 720–22. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. at 721–22. 
110 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.3 cmt. a (1999). 
111 See id. 
112 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 16. 
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The problem with associating ineffective revocations with DRR is that ineffective revocation is broader in 
scope than DRR. Ineffective revocations include not only those performed without revocatory intent, but also 
those rendered invalid by other factors such as when a will is not properly executed, is procured through undue 
influence or fraud or is the product of testamentary incapacity.113 Such revocations are just as ineffective as 
those performed mistakenly, but they do not have very much to do with DRR. To label a revocation ineffective 
also suggests that there is a class of revocations in which the acts performed, albeit with intent to revoke, are not 
themselves legally sufficient on some technical ground (such as in a jurisdiction that does not recognize partial 
revocation by physical act or when the act is somehow inadequate) despite the testator’s expressed intention to 
revoke. These revocations, albeit ineffective, would not be particularly good premises upon which to base a 
DRR analysis. The term ineffective revocation is simply too broad to be used to accurately describe DRR. 
3. Mistaken Revocation 
The law of wills has not been kind to testators who make mistakes.114 DRR is an exception to this general 
antipathy toward correcting testamentary errors. The classic DRR case involves a testator who revokes his 
will or part thereof by mistake or upon the mistaken belief that a different dis-position will be effective, and 
the court disregards the revocation to allow the testator’s property to pass according to the terms of the will 
rather than by intestacy.115 The most common set of facts within this paradigm finds the testator avidly 
tinkering with his validly executed will in such a manner that it appears to have been revoked via cancellation 
of its dispositive provisions.116 Thus, the executed will is found “marked up,” sometimes with lines drawn 
through its dispositive provisions.117 These circumstances trigger the question whether the will was cancelled 
or obliterated with the intent to revoke the will or certain provisions.118 At the same time, the testator has not 
succeeded in making a new will that is legally effective in the way he apparently wishes.119 In one set of 
cases, the testator simply makes a set of notes of what dispositions the new will might contain—a “rough draft 
for future changes” as it was described in one case.120 In a related set of cases, the testator in a jurisdiction that 
permits partial revocation by physical act lines out persons, property, or values in his will and makes 
handwritten substitutions. The lineouts are presumptively valid revocations, but the handwritten substitutions 
are nonprobatable additions. In a third set of cases, the testator executes a new will, but for some reason the 
dispositive provisions in the new will are legally invalid. 
a. Cancellation and a Rough Draft for Future Changes 
The type of revocation that is most associated with DRR is cancellation.121 This association is because the 
classic case of DRR often involves a testator who tinkers with her old will while she is formulating her new 
one. In the classic case, the testator, wishing only to make minor changes to her estate plan, either lines out 
portions of her existing will and simultaneously makes substitutions of persons, property, or values on the will 
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itself, or makes a set of notes on the way she prefers her testamentary plan to look on another sheet of paper. 
The notes are not probatable.122 
It may seem, to the observer who finds the cancelled will with the notes, that this testator may not have 
wanted to revoke her old will unless the new one was legally effective.123 Further support for this story is 
found in the similarity between the existing will and the notes—the supposition being that a testator who 
radically changes her estate plan means to revoke her will unconditionally despite the fact that her new plans 
have not been rendered legally effective.124 
The facts of the classic case have been the backdrop for many DRR cases. And yet the testator within 
them does not seem to fit the description of one whose revocation is mistaken in any sense about the efficacy 
of an alternative disposition. A reasonable testator who already has a validly executed will does not believe 
that her notes are somehow probatable. She is not mistaken or under a misimpression that they are. The notes 
are simply the first step in the direction of carrying out a new estate plan. Thus, the theory of mistake that 
underlies DRR must be something more particular. 
That something might become clearer by considering the lineouts and interlineations cases. The changes 
are certainly the work of an overzealous testator, eager to remap her estate plan. But are they mistakes? Not, 
of course, in jurisdictions where partial revocation by physical act is not permitted.125 Even if a testator is 
mistaken about the legal validity of her lineouts in such a jurisdiction, there is simply no doctrine to help her. 
DRR has no application there because its utility is limited to ignoring a revocation and not substantiating one. 
However, if the lineouts either so completely obscure the underlying words that the words cannot be 
discerned126 or are so spread across the face of the will that the words suggest a full cancellation of the will,127 
the presence of a rough draft for future changes might suggest a not-quite-settled revocatory intent or a streak 
of recklessness, but not a mistake about the efficacy of the rough draft.128 Unless the testator revokes by 
physical act or by subsequent writing, DRR is simply irrelevant in the jurisdictions disallowing partial 
physical revocations. But whether or not DRR is applicable, describing the revocation as mistaken might not 
quite hit the mark if what is really meant is that what looks like a full and complete revocation on its face has 
not been carried out with the requisite revocatory intent. 
Two cases serve to support this analysis. Kroll v. Nehmer,129 is a good example of a case in which no 
revocation has taken place upon which to base an analysis of DRR.130 Chronologically, there were two wills 
and two drafts131—although discerning from the facts just how rough the two drafts were is impossible.132 The 
drafts, however, were unwitnessed and thus incapable of being admitted to probate. At the time she drafted 
the third document, the testator, Margaret Binco, wrote “VOID” across the back of the second will.133 A 
student of the law of wills can ascertain right away that Binco’s second will was not properly revoked and 
was admissible to probate. None of the definitions of DRR seem to relate to these facts. Astonishingly, 
however, the court’s decision fills eight pages of the regional reporter with a tortured discussion of DRR and 
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its relationship to the case.134 The case simply reminds us that rough draft cases often provide infertile ground 
upon which to apply DRR.135 
In Carter v. First United Methodist Church of Albany,136 by contrast, Mildred Tipton’s first will was 
found with lines drawn through enough of its provisions to raise a presumption of complete revocation.137 The 
first will was folded together with a rough draft, which outlined a different distributional scheme.138 The issue 
was whether the presumption of absolute revocation raised by the markings on the will could be overcome.139 
The court rightly focused not on the testator’s mistake, but on her lack of revocatory intent in lining out the 
provisions of her first will.140 In other words, her actions did not reflect someone mistaken about the validity 
of her rough draft, but instead someone whose actions were one step ahead of her intentions, thus preventing 
the ‘“[j]oint operation of act and intention’” necessary for revocation.141 
b. Partial Revocation by Physical Act and Attempted Amendment 
Some jurisdictions do permit partial revocation by physical act. In these jurisdictions, acts that fall short 
of a cancellation of the entire will may nonetheless constitute partial cancellations of the will. The testator 
partially revoking his will in this manner often amends the revoked provisions with the addition of new 
persons, property, or values. If the will is not thereafter reexecuted, the amendments have no legal effect 
unless they satisfy the requirements of a holographic testamentary instrument in jurisdictions that recognize 
such instruments.142 Can DRR be employed under these circumstances? Two cases from Mississippi applied 
DRR but reached different outcomes based on the testator’s presumed intent. 
In In re Estate of Carpenter,143 the testator had marked through portions of her will (rendering some 
illegible) and had made handwritten additions above the lineouts as if to amend the will.144 The appellate 
court disagreed with the trial court that the testator had revoked the will in its entirety and had died intestate, 
and instead found the partial revocations valid but the additions invalid.145 The court determined that the 
revocations were mistakenly premised upon the effectiveness of the additions, and thus that DRR would be 
employed to probate the will without the partial revocations.146 
In In re Estate of Lyles147 the testator owned 140 acres of land. She originally devised forty acres to a 
friend and 100 acres to her niece.148 Later, she crossed out the devise of forty acres and in the provision 
benefiting the niece substituted “140” for “100.”149 Because partial revocation by physical act is permitted in 
Mississippi, the lining out triggered the presumption of revocation.150 But, like in Carpenter, the attempted 
amendment to the disposition of the acreage was not effective because it was not executed with will 
formalities.151 The court then considered whether it could employ DRR to characterize the revocations as 
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contingent on the effectiveness of the amendment. The court determined that the evidence suggested a desire 
to partially revoke the will even if the substituted acreage would not be an effective change.152 Because the 
testator was attempting to make a change in the distribution of her estate that mirrored the distribution in 
intestacy, the court found that the testator clearly preferred intestate distribution of all of the acreage to her 
niece rather than cancellation of the revocations and reinstatement of the original devises.153 
Although we are justified in assuming that a testator making a set of notes on a separate piece of paper 
may well know that the notes are not probatable, a testator altering language in his executed will may not 
know that those changes are not probatable. Moreover, in this kind of case, the actions taken are easier to 
characterize as constituting a single transaction in which the revocation is related to the attempted change. 
c. A New Will that Fails 
There was a time when the law limited DRR to cases involving revocation by physical act.154 Today, the 
doctrine extends to cases in which a will revokes a prior will either by inconsistency or by an express 
revocation clause.155 Although some jurisdictions reject DRR when a second will contains a plain-language 
revocation clause revoking all prior wills,156 the great weight of authority in this country is to the contrary. 
The typical case involves a bequest in the revoking second will that the law renders of no effect. Thus, it 
becomes the task of the litigant raising DRR to show that the testator “intended such revocation [not] to 
become operative if the revocatory document could not otherwise dispose of his estate to prevent 
intestacy.”157 
Consider La Croix v. Senecal:158 the testator, Celestine Dupre, revoked the residuary bequest of her will by 
means of a second will that contained identical dispositive provisions—one-half to her nephew, the other one-
half to a friend.159 The second will was executed, unnecessarily as it turns out, to clarify the name of her 
nephew.160 Unfortunately, the second will was witnessed by the friend’s husband, rendering the residuary 
bequest to that friend invalid under the interested-witness statute.161 This fact pattern does indeed present the 
kind of mistake of law that DRR is concerned with. Courts often state in such cases that if the testator had 
known the truth she would not have revoked her will. Although the testator had assiduously sought legal advice 
and had made certain her will was properly executed, she had simply been unaware that the law would render 
her well-laid plans of no effect. The court applied DRR to nullify the revocation of the first will.162 
Although the case is an “easy”163 and “deserving”164 case for the application of DRR, La Croix 
nonetheless leaves the reader guessing what the proper method for applying DRR should be. Instead of 
discussing the ambiguity of the revocation, the court led with the doctrinal approach and immediately 
characterized the admittedly compelling circumstances as raising a presumption “that the testator preferred 
the old will to intestacy . . . in the absence of evidence overcoming the presumption.”165 As a companion 
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definition, the court also cited to the “conditional revocation” language from In re Macomber.166 Having leapt 
too far forward in the analysis to retreat, the court is left with no choice but to assert that “[t]here is no room 
for doubt,”167 that it is “obvious[],”168 and that “it is clear”169 that the testator’s revocation was conditioned 
upon the efficacy of the second will.170 In other words, readers are simply to take it at face value that DRR is 
properly applied in La Croix. 
Consider also In re Will of Sharp.171 Juliana Sharp was the donee of a power of appointment created by 
her husband Walter in an inter vivos trust established for Juliana’s lifetime benefit.172 Juliana sought to 
exercise this power in favor of her estate in a succession of four wills executed in 1972, 1974, 1977, and 
1979, as well as in an unexecuted document from 2001.173 Juliana’s son and daughter, Lee and Honey, were 
the joint beneficiaries of the earlier wills, but Lee was the primary beneficiary of the 1979 will and the 2001 
document.174 Language in the 1972 and 1974 wills explained that the unequal treatment was justified by 
Honey’s status as the sole beneficiary of a different trust created by Walter.175 It appeared for this reason that 
Juliana wished to benefit Lee more handsomely than Honey in her will. 
Only photocopies of the 1977 and 1979 wills existed.176 Those wills were presumed revoked by physical 
act, and because each will in the succession had expressly revoked the previous one,177 Honey’s argument was 
simply that Juliana had died without a will.178 Lee, however, argued that DRR applied, but did not specify 
which will was to be admitted under that theory.179 The trial court agreed, comparing the facts with the 
ineffective-second-will cases and emphasizing the presumption against intestacy.180 Because the 1974 will 
was still in existence, the trial court admitted it to probate.181 
Note the forced nature of the analogy to the classic DRR paradigm in Sharp. Unlike in La Croix, in Sharp 
there were no facts suggesting that the revocation of any of Sharp’s previous wills had been related to the 
creation, not to mention the legal validity, of the 2001 document. Moreover, even assuming its application 
was appropriate, the doctrine should have served only to undo the revocation of the 1979 will and not the 
1974 will, which had itself been revoked by the 1977 will.182 To probate the 1974 will under the doctrine of 
DRR would have required the court to consider a completely different issue: whether revocation of the 1974 
will by the 1977 will was conditioned upon the 1977 will being effective. But this version of the facts is 
belied by the fact that Juliana later revoked the 1977 will itself with an express revocation clause in the 1979 
will.183 The connection between the 1974 will and the 2001 document was simply too attenuated for DRR to 
have applied. A more plausible explanation for Juliana’s succession of wills is that she had changed her mind 
about Lee being the sole beneficiary, but had not yet made up her mind regarding the percentage of her estate 
she wished to leave to Honey. Juliana’s uncertainty is evident in her changing wills and led her to die without 
having expressed (with finality the testamentary plan she wished to be carried out after her death). 
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On appeal, the court disapproved of admitting the 1974 will to probate, citing the lack of evidence to 
support DRR.184 It saw nothing equivocal about Juliana’s actions; they demonstrated her intention with each 
new testamentary scheme to supersede the previous one.185 The appellate court deemed the lower court’s use 
of DRR as threatening to render virtually every case of revocation with a prior will a case for DRR.186 The 
criticism echoes the court in Carter, which lamented that “[s]ome of the cases appear to go to extreme lengths 
in the application of this doctrine, and seem to defeat the very intention at which they were seeking to 
arrive.”187 In response to these criticisms, the following section develops an interpretive method that will 
eliminate some of the concerns about when DRR should be invoked and how it should be applied. 
IV.   AN INTERPRETIVE METHOD FOR DRR 
A. Will Interpretation and Construction 
The quest for testamentary intent is governed by a two-step process of evaluation made up of 
interpretation at stage one, and construction at stage two. The goal of interpretation is to “discover[] the 
meaning or the intention of the testator from permissible data.”188 Permissible data consists of the plain 
language of the document and the circumstances surrounding the making of the will. This data is probably 
sufficient in most cases for the court to ascertain and carry out the intent of the testator. An ambiguity on the 
face of the will or revealed by attempts to apply the will’s terms to objects and persons in the real world may 
be resolved at this stage by the admission of extrinsic evidence. If this process fails to disclose the testator’s 
intent, construction of the will is the next step. Construction, in contrast to interpretation, is the process of 
attributing intention to the words used by the testator with the aid of rules of construction and constructional 
preferences. Thus, the quest is not for the actual intent of the testator, which has been abandoned as 
unknowable at this stage, but instead is for a conclusion about what a reasonable testator would have been 
intending under the circumstances presented.189 Thus, whatever ambiguity surfaces at step one of the 
interpretive process, if unresolvable with evidence of the testator’s actual intent, can be resolved at step two of 
the process using suppositions about what the reasonable testator would intend. 
The American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatement (Third) of Property advocates jettisoning this framework 
and considering all evidence and presumptions relating to a testator’s intent at the same time.190 This approach 
would have courts consider constructional preferences and rules of construction together with evidence of actual 
intent.191 The reason for this shift away from the traditional two-step approach to will interpretation is no doubt 
an effort to bring a testator’s intention into sharp focus so that a court may do its best to carry it out. In this 
respect, the Restatement’s approach may be intent-promoting. On the other hand, blurring the line between 
interpretation and construction may vest courts with excessive discretion that could be intent-defeating.192 In 
defense of its proposal, the ALI claims that courts have largely abandoned the two-step approach to will 
interpretation.193 But not only is the Restatement’s new approach not the traditional approach; it also appears 
that courts are not yet prepared to adopt it.194 
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The Restatement’s approach, as revolutionary as it may at first blush appear, is not entirely incongruent 
with the concepts underlying the traditional interpretive approach to wills. For example, the exercise of 
connecting the words in the will to the objects in the world to which the words refer always requires resorting 
to matters external to the document.195 In addition, the traditional approach permits the admission of evidence 
of “surrounding circumstances,” even at the first stage of will interpretation.196 As Justice Holmes put it, the 
court must interpret the words of the will “in the circumstances in which they were used.”197 Although this 
approach to the interpretation of wills is widely employed,198 there is unfortunately little harmony in the way 
courts describe how surrounding circumstances may be used in the interpretive process.199 Obviously, courts 
cannot use such evidence to imbue the language employed in the will with meanings the evidence cannot 
support.200 But some courts go so far as to bar the introduction of evidence of the surrounding circumstances 
in the absence of ambiguity in the will.201 As a practical matter, though, discovering latent ambiguities in the 
will would be difficult absent evidence of the surrounding circumstances in the first instance.202 
Although the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will have an important role to play in will 
interpretation, one primary problem is defining what constitutes surrounding circumstances. One 
commentator describes the term as “the context in which the testator had the will drafted.”203 Another 
specifies that resorting to evidence of the surrounding circumstances recognizes the necessity of “plac[ing] 
the court in the position of the parties at the time the instrument was created.”204 The Restatement lists “the 
donor’s occupation, property at the time of execution of the document, and relationships with family members 
and with other persons, including the designated or apparently designated donees.”205 Other understandings of 
surrounding circumstances focus more directly on what events occurred around the time of the execution of 
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the will206 or on what the testator did or did not intend to be included in her will when she signed it.207 
Sometimes the controlling law or common business practices at the time of the execution of the will constitute 
the surrounding circumstances.208 In keeping with this understanding, the time frame is necessarily restricted: 
surrounding circumstances do not include events occurring after the execution of the will.209 
B. Will Interpretation and DRR 
Where does DRR figure in this framework? Does it trigger a presumption of probable intent? Is DRR a 
canon of construction? With DRR seldom understood as part of an interpretive process, no wonder that its 
workings remain somewhat mysterious. Treatises and casebooks invariably present the doctrine alongside 
material covering the methods and ramifications of revocation. Although intent is relevant at this juncture, 
intent is not the central problem under examination. With DRR, by contrast, intent is the primary, if not the 
sole, concern. Without a better sense of how DRR can help to determine a testator’s probable intent for the 
revocation of her will, decisions applying DRR will continue to exhibit discontinuity and incoherence. 
The way DRR works within the interpretive process has never been adequately explained, but the foregoing 
discussion has hopefully underscored significant insights. First, theories of conditional, ineffective, and mistaken 
revocations are not helpful in understanding DRR because they either refer too broadly to other sorts of 
revocations or suggest an awareness that the testator does not possess when she revokes her will (such as with 
conditional and mistaken revocations). Second, treating DRR like a presumption has undermined many DRR 
analyses because it implies that as long as some combination of factors is present, DRR can be applied 
mechanically in one step. This mechanical one-step analysis causes the courts to flounder when they arrive at the 
point of applying the DRR principles they have articulated, leaving the reader unconvinced that the case at hand 
is “clearly” an “easy” and “deserving” case to which to apply DRR. 
Ideally, courts that resort to DRR should employ a two-step process that mirrors the familiar process of 
will interpretation. This suggestion is unique, because it posits that courts should only consider the 
applicability of DRR when confronted with ambiguous revocations, not ineffective, conditional, or mistaken 
ones. Thus, the first step in the process is to ascertain whether the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
revocation reveal that the intent behind the revocation is ambiguous. This evaluation of whether the 
circumstances suggest a revocation that is equivocal or ambiguous parallels the approach to disclosing latent 
ambiguities in wills. 
If the court determines that the revocatory intent is ambiguous, then the court is in a good position to 
proceed to the second stage. At the second stage of the process, the ambiguity must be resolved either with 
evidence of the testator’s actual intent or with canons of construction that impute intent based on what we 
conclude a reasonable testator would intend under the circumstances. This step involves considering factors 
that the courts and commentators have identified, including: (1) whether the revocation and the attempted new 
disposition are part of one scheme,210 (2) how similar or dissimilar the dispositions are to the disposition that 
would occur if the revocation is deemed effective,211 and (3) whether the new disposition is rendered partially 
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ineffective by a factor surrounding its execution or by an event completely unrelated to it.212 When studied as 
a process, the idea that DRR involves impliedly conditional revocations more clearly becomes a distracting 
fiction. Using this proposed method will cause courts to linger more patiently over the evidence presented in 
DRR cases and to craft DRR analyses that are more complete and convincing. 
Admittedly, what is underscored most of all in this proposal is that DRR must be placed within the 
framework used whenever courts interpret a will.213 Because courts seek to elicit intent from any application 
of DRR, DRR must be considered foremost a process and not a doctrine. Other commentators have also 
suggested that DRR needs to be applied methodically. Professor Roger Andersen, for example, recommends 
the following process: 
As a device for keeping DRR under control, treat every revocation separately and ask, “Did 
this happen by mistake?” If not, ignore DRR. If so, proceed to analyze what alternative 
dispositions would be available if the mistake were undone, asking of each, “Would the 
testator have preferred this one?”214 
Professor Frank Schiavo has even developed an impressive flowchart for the purpose of applying DRR.215 
But as useful as these contributions appear to be, they are nonetheless flawed in retaining an emphasis on 
mistake, failing to mention ambiguity in connection with the revocations submitted to a DRR analysis, and 
not referring to the process of will interpretation. Also concerning—for all the reasons articulated in Part 
II.B—is that Schiavo’s flowchart calls for determining, in the second step of the process, whether the testator 
has a presumed intent to revive the first will. 
C. Reconsidering DRR Decisions 
Reconsideration of the cases discussed above will serve to illustrate the application of the author’s 
proposed alternative two-step process in DRR cases. La Croix is, as commentators have pointed out, “an easy 
case for applying DRR.”216 But the analysis would have been much more convincing if the court had taken the 
two-step approach to DRR. If the court had simply stated that what appeared to be a plainly worded 
revocation clause in the first will was rendered ambiguous by the surrounding circumstances—that is, the 
nullifying effect of the interested-witness statute—the court could then have proceeded to resolve the 
ambiguity by using DRR to impute the intent of the reasonable testator to the testator in that case, Celestine 
Dupre. After all, the court knew little about Dupre’s actual intent and it unnecessarily encumbered the 
analysis by engaging in speculations about how the revocation must have been mistaken or conditional. Using 
DRR as a canon of construction would have allowed the court to focus squarely on the similarity of the two 
dispositions both in terms of the objects of Dupre’s bounty and the property she wished them to receive. 
Lingering a bit longer over these considerations would have had the salutary effect of freeing the court from 
producing an opinion peppered by assertions of its obvious truth. The court would instead have stated with 
greater confidence that, under the circumstances presented, a reasonable testator does not have an intent to 
revoke her first will. 
However, not every case requires a lengthy, painstaking analysis. In some cases, a consideration of the 
surrounding circumstances will be sufficient. This analysis was sufficient in In re Alburn’s Estate,217 in which 
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the testator tore her second will to pieces and directed her agent to let them “fly in the wind.”218 Although this 
action is not necessarily an ambiguous revocation, in In re Alburn’s Estate there was a prior will and Alburn 
stated that she wished that prior will to control the disposition of her estate.219 Because the law of the relevant 
jurisdiction at that time did not permit revival of the prior will under these circumstances, Alburn’s revocation 
of the second will was ambiguous.220 But the ambiguity was easily resolved because of Alburn’s statement. 
Luckily, a copy of the second will existed in the office of Alburn’s attorney.221 Its similarity to the terms of 
the will Alburn wanted to revive and its dissimilarity to intestate distribution made it perfectly plausible that 
Alburn would prefer the second will to intestacy.222 Similar evidence existed in the wrongly decided In re 
McCaffrey’s Estate,223 in which the testator wrote his intention to revive the first will on the cancelled second 
will. But most DRR cases lack evidence of this sort and will require proceeding through the two steps of the 
interpretive process before a proper outcome lies in view. 
Additionally, a determination that the revocation is ambiguous will not necessarily result in invalidating 
the revocation. In In re Dougan’s Estate224 the court noted two discernible transactions: one in which the 
testator obliterated the provisions of her will and declared them revoked, and the second in which the testator 
visited her attorney and presented an outline of items she wished a new will to contain.225 The new will was 
never executed because the testator became ill within hours of the visit and died shortly thereafter.226 The 
court was convinced that the testator was not trying to revive a prior will because the prior will contained 
dispositive provisions that conflicted with the sort of bequests she desired to appear in her new will.227 Thus, 
though the circumstances supported a finding that the revocation was ambiguous at the first stage of the DRR 
analysis, the ambiguity was resolved by considering evidence that the testator wanted to remove certain 
persons from her will to benefit her son who was not a beneficiary in either of her wills.228 As in Alburn, the 
testator’s statements about her intent were relevant to resolving the ambiguity that arose due to the short 
period of time within which her obliteration of her will and her visit to the attorney occurred. Because we do 
not know what the testator’s true intent was from the available facts, employing a reasonable testator standard 
to resolve the ambiguity that was raised by the facts is permissible. 
There is no question that, as the Restatement notes, a slightly different set of facts might serve as a proper 
basis for the application of DRR.229 In a case in which a testator revokes his will and then contacts an attorney 
with details relating to the new will he wishes to execute, step one of the analysis results in the same analytical 
position as the court took in Dougan—the conclusion that the revocation is ambiguous. If the pattern of 
distribution, unlike in Dougan, suggests that a testator has a preference for the old will versus a preference for 
intestacy, DRR resolves the ambiguity. DRR offers the resolution not because we have such strong evidence of 
the testator’s actual intent, but because the reasonable testator would have preferred the old will. 
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But consider a case in which no steps are taken to draw up a new will. The findings in Larrick v. 
Larrick230 showed that the testator destroyed his will with the intention of making a new one but did not 
contact a lawyer or prepare an outline of the dispositive provisions he desired.231 The trial court determined 
that the testator’s revocation was conditional, but the appellate court reversed, reasoning merely that the 
presumption that the testator physically destroyed his will with the intent to revoke it had not been 
overcome.232 A similar result occurred in Estate of McKeever,233 in which the testator’s revoked will was 
found with unexecuted will forms that could not be linked in time with the revocatory act performed on the 
executed will.234 The court, in ruling that DRR does not come into play unless the alternative dispositive 
scheme is actually executed but contains a defect,235 was clearly wrong on the law. The McKeever court might 
have done better to suggest, as did the court in Larrick, that the testator had not gone far enough in the 
direction of creating a new will to warrant invoking DRR. 
With Dougan and Larrick in view, how should a court resolve a case like In re Bronham,236 in which the 
testator expressed his desire to revoke his old will and was in contact with his attorney about drawing up a 
new will? The new will, the proposed contents of which were never established, was never prepared due to 
the illness of the attorney.237 Meanwhile, the testator died, having mutilated his will.238 Here the court had 
evidence, as it did in Larrick, that the testator wished to put together a new will, but it had no details about the 
contents of the new dispositive scheme—only the fact that the testator contacted an attorney. Does this fact 
alone put the case on footing different from Larrick as the Restatement suggests? If DRR is truly a 
presumption, then it forces the conclusion that the first will must stand. This analysis is how the court decided 
the case. However, the fact that Bronham picked up a telephone but Larrick did not seems too slight a basis 
on which to distinguish the cases. A sounder approach would have been for the Bronham court to have 
resolved the ambiguity with the evidence that the testator had no heirs at law, and the question of whether he 
would have preferred intestacy was for that reason moot. 
If the Bronham, Larrick, and McKeever courts had considered the revocations ambiguous and had 
proceeded to resolve them, the decisions in all three cases would have been much stronger and the distinction 
among them that much plainer. The McKeever and Larrick courts would have resolved the ambiguity by 
considering attributed intent and declaring that the reasonable testator in such circumstances is not displaying a 
hesitancy to revoke based on the efficacy of a new dispositive scheme. By raising DRR as a presumption, these 
courts merely perplex readers, disabling them from understanding decisions in DRR cases as anything more than 
ad hoc. 
V. AN ILLUSTRATION FROM THE CLASSROOM 
I have taught wills, trusts and intestate estates for fifteen years. I have discussed DRR with each class 
using a casebook for ten years and my own materials for the last five. The cases I use to illustrate DRR are In 
re Will of Sharp,239 described above, and In re Will of Collins.240 The trial court in Sharp applied DRR with a 
very broad brush, eventually electing to admit to probate the second of a succession of five documents 
consisting of four wills and an unexecuted draft.241 The appellate court reversed, finding no basis for applying 
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DRR.242 Both cases rely on the Macomber decision, which employs the by now familiar definition of DRR-
cum-conditional revocation.243 They both invoke the presumption against intestacy as well.244 The Sharp case 
gives students a potent warning that the doctrine is misapplied when the connection between the revocation 
and an alternative testamentary plan or between the revocation and a misapprehension of law or facts is 
“purely speculative.”245 
In re Will of Collins is of the classic variety of DRR cases that involve the testator’s tinkering with her old 
will by striking out certain provisions and inserting names, property, or amounts as substitutions.246 Because 
New York does not permit partial revocation by physical act, the court had to determine first whether the 
markings constituted a revocation of the entire will. The court held that the markings indicated an intent to 
change the will, not to revoke it.247 But as an alternative approach to this same outcome, the court employed 
DRR to conclude that, even if the markings did constitute a revocation, they should be ignored because the 
testator clearly did not desire to die intestate.248 Collins helps students practice recognizing revocations, but it 
also opens up a discussion of what evidence would better support the use of DRR than the court’s conclusory 
reliance on the presumption against intestacy. 
Questions of revocation feature prominently on my wills examinations going back fifteen years, but I do not 
recall having tested students on DRR specifically before the fall of 2012. Bar exam questions, however, some-
times trigger issues of DRR.249 In the fall of 2012, I decided to test my wills students on their understanding of 
DRR. The fact pattern finds the testator, Meredith Rosado, visiting her attorney to execute a new will (W2). She 
brings her old will (W1) with her. She intends to change the recipients of two items—an item of real property 
and an item of personal property. The recipient of her residuary estate is the same in both wills. 
In her meeting with the attorney but before executing W2, Rosado writes “This will is not good” on W1 
and then draws large Xs from corner to corner on each page. Rosado then executes W2, which is to be left in 
the care of her attorney given Rosado’s fear that she might misplace it in her impending move to a new home. 
Before leaving the office, Rosado says to her attorney, “I want you to know, though, Saul, that if you lose 
W2, I want W1 to stand.” W2 is later destroyed in a conflagration at the attorney’s office. Upon the testator’s 
death no copy of W2 can be found, and its terms cannot be legally established. 
As the reader can no doubt discern, this fact pattern raises issues in addition to DRR. For the sake of 
focusing on DRR, however, the first step in the analysis is to recognize that a court will determine that 
Rosado did not revoke W2. With respect to W1, though, a court could determine either that Rosado’s 
defacements of W1 revoked that will by physical act or that the execution of W2 revoked W1 by 
inconsistency. What, then, is a plausible conclusion about the applicability of DRR? 
A student of the law of wills is perfectly within her rights to question whether physical destruction of the 
original will followed by the successful execution of a new will that is later burned is a proper predicate for 
the application of DRR. Indeed the La Croix v. Senecal250 court stresses that the revocation must be 
accomplished “with a present intention of making a new one immediately and as a substitute.”251 But for some 
students a myopic focus on the necessity that the revocation be conditional and on the time frame from which 
to draw evidence showing such conditionality appeared to get in the way of a fuller analysis. One student 
responded as follows: 
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Here, if W1 is successfully revoked, and she says to the attorney “I want you to know that 
if you lose W2 I want W1 to stand,” [DRR] most definitely [would] not work because it has 
already been revoked at the time of the execution of W2. The conditional revocation would 
need to happen [when W1 is revoked], not when she is executing W2.252 
Perhaps more artfully phrased were these three responses: 
Here, even though Rosado told her attorney that she wants W1 to stand if W2 is lost, a 
court is not likely to find that DRR applies. Rosado stated the condition after she duly 
executed W2, which had already revoked W1. Since Rosado did not communicate a 
condition of revocation when she was revoking W1, the revocation of W1 was not 
conditional. DRR only applies if the court finds [that] the actual act of revocation is based on 
a condition. There is no evidence that Rosado had such a condition in mind at the time she 
revoked W2.253 
Weighing in favor of the fact that the revocation was independent enough to constitute a 
non-conditional revocation is that she completely and separately revoked W1, crossing out 
each page and not mentioning in her brief writing at the top of it that she planned for W2 to 
dispose of her estate.254 
Here, W1 was revoked through Rosado’s defacements. And only after that was W2 
executed in a will execution ceremony. As such, since W1 had been revoked prior to the 
execution of W2, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation has no application here. W1 
was not revoked on the condition that W2 was valid.255 
These responses are consistent with the tenet that courts should apply DRR sparingly, but the students 
insist on a showing of conditionality that, as explained above, is not particularly realistic in DRR cases. The 
responses demonstrate that the concept of conditionality in DRR is a distraction and that by asking, in the 
alternative, whether the revocation was ambiguous, a court will be better positioned to catch other important 
factors that suggest that the revocation and the new dispositive plan were part of one scheme. 
Even responses that resulted in the opposite outcome emphasized conditionality as dispositive: 
Here, Rosado conditioned the revocation of her former will upon the existence of the 
subsequent will at her death; she told her attorney Saul Packer that if he were to lose her 
second will she wanted the first will to stand (as opposed to having her estate distributed 
under intestacy law). This condition was not fulfilled, however, because of a fire that 
destroyed Packer’s office and her second will that was contained therein. Thus, given that the 
revocation of her first will was conditional and the condition was not fulfilled, Rosado’s first 
will can be probated.256 
But again, even though Rosado’s statement to her attorney approaches a condition, her statement is not 
conditional but is instead an expression of what she prefers to happen. As illustrated above,257 if statements 
like Rosado’s render a revocation conditional, courts do not need to resort to DRR. If a revocation has an 
actual condition attached to it, the more complex analysis that is demanded by DRR would be superfluous. 
One response to the examination question approached the two-step analytical method that is advocated in 
this Article: 
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Here, it is unclear whether Rosado’s revocation of the original will was really dependent 
on the condition that W2 remain her will or if she did in fact revoke but decide afterward that 
if W2 didn’t stick that W1 would be OK, too. As it is not clear, DRR cannot be applied.258 
But as quickly as this response approaches a discussion of the ambiguity of the revocation, it retreats, 
concluding that ambiguity and DRR are somehow incompatible. This conclusion could be from a 
misperception that courts should somehow see conditionality in the revocation before DRR is even relevant. It 
certainly stems from the misperception that a glance at the facts will instantly reveal whether a DRR claim is 
viable. 
Instead, a court should approach a DRR analysis in two stages, asking first whether the revocation is 
ambiguous. First, a court should consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the revocation. Rosado 
made an appointment with her attorney to execute a new will and she did not revoke W1 until she was in her 
attorney’s office preparing to execute the new will. Moreover, whether or not the defacements she made to 
W1 were with the intent to revoke, the facts illustrate that W1 was revoked either by the defacements or by 
the execution of W2, which disposed of her entire estate. Her bringing W1 to the meeting and defacing it in 
that context means, at the very least, that she considered the revocation of W1 to be connected in some way 
with the reason she made the appointment—the execution of W2. Moreover, Rosado then says she would 
prefer W1 to stand if her attorney loses W2. The revocation is thus ambiguous because the testator’s intent 
regarding whether she would want the revocation to stand if the will is later destroyed in a fire is not clear. 
Had she not defaced W1 or even brought it with her to the meeting, we could more justifiably conclude that 
her revocation via the inconsistent provisions of W2 is less ambiguous because she did not have the 
revocation of W1 as fully on her mind as she did the execution of W2. And had she performed the 
defacements to W1 at home absent any kind of plan to execute a new will, we could justifiably conclude that 
her revocation was not ambiguous. At this first stage of the interpretive process, a court should consider all of 
the factors that could support an assessment that the revocation was either ambiguous or unambiguous. 
Arriving at a final conclusion that DRR renders the revocation inoperative is unnecessary at this stage. 
At the second stage of the interpretive process, courts should consider whether the evidence of actual 
intent, or intent that we can attribute to the testator based on assumptions about reasonable testators, supports 
ignoring the revocation in question. Arguably, Rosado’s statement to her attorney comes very close to an 
expression of actual intent that W1 stands in the event W2 is legally inoperative. In the alternative, if the 
statement feels inconclusive and does not support anything more than the conclusion that the revocation is 
ambiguous, considering attributed intent is then proper. The facts provide little information about the 
relationship of Rosado to her beneficiaries or the value of her estate, but as illustrated in additional facts 
provided on the exam, Rosado chose to benefit primarily friends, colleagues, and her “helpmate.” W2 
removes her nephew from the will. It would be helpful to know why Rosado chose to eliminate him and to 
know the value of her home in proportion to her residuary estate. Without this information, a court could 
soundly conclude that a reasonable testator whose wills have primarily benefited nonfamily members would 
choose a will that reflected this preference over dying intestate. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of DRR is an intent-promoting doctrine that plays an important role in the law of wills. The 
fact that revocations take effect immediately and can have devastating consequences on the estate plans of 
unsuspecting testators or those represented by unskilled legal counsel may explain why this doctrine has 
emerged in the context of a body of law that is largely unsympathetic to correcting the mistakes testators 
make. But as important as the doctrine is, DRR has long suffered from various doctrinal imprecisions and 
inconsistencies. 
Judicial use of DRR has been inconsistent at best. At times, the courts apply the doctrine directly to the 
facts, appearing to make conclusions about the testator’s actual intent without thinking more deeply about, 
first, what the facts suggest about the quality of the revocation, and second, what a reasonable testator in that 
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position would have preferred. In other cases, courts have used DRR as an alternative basis for their 
decisions, as if they were not certain enough about their primary reasoning and wished to press DRR into 
service as a bolstering principle. This practice muddies our understanding of DRR’s appropriate function. 
Some of these missteps are possibly attributable to a misapprehension of the relation DRR bears to the 
doctrine of revival. The more likely cause is our misguided sense that DRR is a special kind of revocation 
instead of a way to interpret the quality and character of revocations. 
Repositioning DRR as a tool for determining a testator’s probable intent, rather than a mere corollary of 
revocation, would afford the legal system several advantages. The first of these advantages is judicial 
economy. A reenvisioned doctrine would dissuade courts from applying it just because a case presents a 
succession of wills, and would inspire courts to more carefully consider whether the circumstances of such 
cases warrant consideration of DRR at all. The second advantage arises from harmonizing DRR with the law 
of will interpretation. Treating DRR as a type of revocation with its own independent logic has led to 
discontinuity in the development of the doctrine. If we situate DRR within the familiar framework of will 
interpretation, it will no longer be an isolated doctrine with contours that are blurry and unmoored to any 
other area of the law of wills. Finally, a two-stage interpretive approach to DRR will serve as a reminder that 
DRR is a tool for ascertaining probable intention; DRR cases usually figure among those in which the 
testator’s actual intent is unknown. If the testator has been clear in his or her will that the revocation is 
conditional, or if the surrounding circumstances provide clear evidence that he or she is laboring under a 
mistake of law regarding the efficacy of his or her new disposition, considering DRR would be largely 
unnecessary. Repackaged as a process within the familiar framework of will interpretation, DRR will better 
position courts to carry out the important work of promoting testators’ intent. 
